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Say "I Do": The Judicial Duty to Heighten Constitutional
Scrutiny of Immigration Policies Affecting Same-Sex
Binational Couples
CoRi K. GARLAND*
INTRODUCTION
Eric Afiholter knew he was breaking the law.1 Eric, a former district public
defender in St. Louis City, was aware that arranging a sham marriage between a female
friend and his gay Peruvian partner, Pedro Cerna-Rojas, could ruin his legal career,
lead to his criminal prosecution, and cause his partner's deportation. But what was his
choice? Eric loved Pedro.
The couple met in 2002 when Pedro was pursuing his degree in international
business.2 They fell in love, and, like many couples, decided to purchase a home and
build a life together.3 As Pedro's student visa neared expiration in 2004, the couple
contacted an immigration attorney.4 Pedro and Eric found no legal means to keep
Pedro in the United States, so Eric arranged a sham marriage between a friend and
Pedro in December 2004. 5
Eric was indicted for marital fraud on June 1, 2007.6 Pedro left the country and
returned to Peru.7 For simply desiring to live in the same country with a man that he
loved, Eric faced up to five years imprisonment and a fine of up to $250,000,8 as well
as potential suspension or disbarment in Missouri. 9 On October 12,2007, U.S. District
Court Judge Catherine Perry sentenced Eric to a year of probation and a $2000 fine.' 0
Judge Perry noted that her leniency was due to Eric taking responsibility for his crime
and the unlikelihood of a repeat offense.' Although Eric is now a convicted felon, a
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Indiana University Maurer School of Law - Bloomington. I
would like to thank Professor Dawn Johnsen and Jennifer Schuster for their thoughtful critiques.
I dedicate this Note to Nancy Lawing and John Hursh: Thank you for your love, support, and
inspiration.
1. Heather Ratcliffe, Sham Marriage Nets Year of Probation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Oct. 13, 2007, at A10.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. "A marriage is a sham 'if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married."' Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir.
1979) (quoting Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis omitted)).
6. Robert Patrick, Charges Reveal Immigration Dilemma for Gay Couples, ST. LouIs
PosT-DISPATCH, June 11, 2007, at B 1.
7. Id.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2006).
9. On November 20, 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court suspended Eric Affholter's law
license for two years. Former Public Defender's Law License is Suspended, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 2007, at B4.
10. Ratcliffe, supra note 1, at MI.
11. Id.
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crowd of supporters applauded him as he left the courtroom.' 2 More than sixty
supporters wrote Judge Perry asking for leniency.' 3 Eric's father, Lloyd Affholter,
wrote in his plea, "Wrong yes, but the crime was not an act of malice, but an act of
love."
14
Consider another scenario:' 5 Nancy, a U.S. citizen, meets and falls in love with
Jane, a British citizen. Jane, an affluent woman, planned to move to the United States,
purchase a home, pay taxes, and generally contribute to the U.S. economy. However,
this proved to be impossible since Jane is a foreign-national woman involved with
another woman. The process was complicated and hostile:
I tried to find a legal way of staying with my partner in the US but this proved to
be difficult, demoralising, degrading and even quite hostile at times. At the time I
had a visa that allowed me 6 months stay at a time in the US. As I entered the
country on my last visit, the official at passport control said "you are coming to the
US too much." Of course there is no word of what constitutes "too much." I said
that my visa only had another six months to run and he merely said "we can
invalidate your visa at any time.'
16
Jane tried to acquire a professional working visa; however, Jane needed to qualify as a
professional and have a position within a particular field in order to procure this visa.'
7
Obtaining an E2 visa can be difficult: the government only issues approximately
40,000 each year,' 8 and these visas are gone within the first few days of the year. As
Jane states, "I was constantly being told by Attorneys [sic] that the easiest way to get in
to the U.S. was to marry an American. If that route had been open to me I certainly
would have done that, but I could not as America discriminates against same[-]sex
partnerships."' 9 As a result, Nancy left the United States. She lamented,
It is not fair that we could not have stayed in America and lived and worked there.
If I had been a man, there would not have been a problem. There are different laws
for "straight" people in the US. The UK does not just let anyone into their country,
but they do not discriminate against same[-]sex partnership.20
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The first-person narrative of Nancy and Jane's visa experience is on file with the
Indiana Law Journal [hereinafter Narrative]. For other examples of the hardships faced by
same-sex, binational couples, see ScoTr LONG, JESSICA STERN & ADAM FRANCOEUR, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH & IMMIGRATION EQUAL., FAMILY, UNVALUED: DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE
FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S. LAW (2006) [hereinafter FAMILY,
UNVALUED].
16. Narrative, supra note 15.
17. See Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Employment-Based Visas,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/typesl 323.html.
18. See Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Bulletin for Dec. 2007,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_3841 .html.
19. Narrative, supra note 15.
20. Id.
[Vol. 84:689
SAME-SEX BINA TIONAL COUPLES
Same-sex binational couples face tremendous obstacles to maintaining their loving,
committed relationships in the United States.21 Like Eric and Nancy, their choices
frequently are limited to marital fraud or leaving the country. With the passage of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, Congress strictly defined marriage
as the union between a man and a woman, which effectively barred gay and lesbian
couples from marriage and its legal entitlements.22 Federal law provides more than
1138 benefits, rights, and protections on the basis of marital status. 23 One legal
entitlement of marriage is the relative ease with which a heterosexual binational couple
may acquire a visa for the non-citizen spouse.24 The immigration problems for same-
sex binational couples have two main causes: first, that immigration law is family-
centered, and second, that the U.S. government refuses to recognize same-sex marriage
and same-sex families. What is a person to do if U.S. immigration law and policy will
not recognize his or her family as a family? What is the role of the judiciary in this
problem? Although the Constitution confers on Congress what the Supreme Court has
described as plenary power to create and regulate immigration law,25 this Note argues
that it is appropriate for the judiciary to be less deferential to Congress in these matters
in order to protect U.S. citizens from constitutional infringements created by these
laws.
This Note will explore the constitutionality of immigration law's discrimination
against same-sex binational couples-that question is contingent upon the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans in general-and the role the judiciary
should play in remedying this situation. Part I evaluates the constitutionality of same-
sex marriage bans and argues that a heightened form of scrutiny should be applied to
challenges to these bans. Part II describes current immigration law, its overarching
policies, and how these laws affect same-sex binational couples. Part III scrutinizes
Congress' plenary power and the judiciary's deference to this power despite the
historical use of immigration law to discriminate against gays and lesbians and various
ethnic groups. Finally, this Note proposes that the discrimination against U.S. citizens
21. For this Note, a binational couple is defined as a couple composed of one U.S. citizen
partner and one foreign-national partner. Furthermore, this Note only focuses on civil marriages,
not civil unions.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (2006).
23. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT:
UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1 (2004).
24. See FAMmY, UNVALUED, supra note 15, at 8.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power... To establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization."). The Supreme Court has held that Congress should be given
wide discretion in matters of immigration because of its plenary power to regulate this matter.
"The Court without exception has sustained Congress's 'plenary power to make rules for the
admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has
forbidden."' Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,766 (1972) (citing Boutilier v. INS 387 U.S.
118, 123 (1967)). But see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) ("But that [plenary]
power is subject to important constitutional limitations."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,941-
42 (1983) (stating that Congress must choose "a constitutionally permissible means of
implementing" that power); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (stating that congressional authority is limited "by the Constitution itself
and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all
civilized nations").
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in same-sex binational couples warrants heightened judicial scrutiny of immigration
laws and less deference to Congress' plenary power than what the courts historically
have given to immigration matters.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
A constitutional challenge to immigration laws as discriminatory against same-sex
binational couples is contingent upon a successful constitutional challenge to same-sex
marriage bans, particularly the federal DOMA. The constitutionality of same-sex
marriage bans has been analyzed exhaustively in scholarly literature, so this Note will
only provide a brief analysis of this issue.26 Currently, the Supreme Court has not
recognized sexual orientation as a suspect classification that warrants heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 Given that
same-sex marriage bans can likely survive rational basis scrutiny,2 s this Part briefly
examines three constitutional arguments for heightened scrutiny analysis, which the
same-sex marriage bans could not withstand.
A. Substantive Due Process Arguments
1. The Fundamental Right to Marry
The Supreme Court has held that marriage is a fundamental right and has derived
this right from the liberty implicit in the Due Process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 29 Loving v. Virginia carefully advanced this argument: "The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 30 The Court stated that
[t]o deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of
26. See generally EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CoNsTITUTIoN (2004)
(offering an in-depth overview of the constitutional arguments against same-sex marriage bans);
DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2006) (providing first-
person accounts from same-sex couples, politicians, and political activists in specific states
where the issue has been contested, as well as analysis of the judiciary's role in this debate);
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CoN: A READER (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) (providing a
collection of the arguments for and against same-sex marriage, including the House and Senate
debates on the Defense of Marriage Act).
27. GERSTMANN, supra note 26, at 41.
28. Id. Courts frequently find that the state can advance rational reasons for limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples. Such reasons include promoting stability in families, fostering
the traditional family, or refusing to create a state endorsement of homosexual behavior. E.g.,
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (concluding that the New York legislature
has rational reasons for creating the same-sex marriage ban). Contra Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the Massachusetts same-sex marriage
ban statute does not survive rational basis review).
29. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
30. 388 U.S. at 12.
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the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law .... Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry a person of another race resides
with the individual and cannot be infringed upon by the State.
3 1
The fundamental right to marry extends beyond the right to marry an individual of
another race. 32 In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court observed, "[a]lthough Loving arose in
the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court
confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals."
33
Because the Court's precedents clearly state that the right to marry is of "fundamental
importance," when a statute significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, the
Court has stated that "'critical examination' of the state interests advanced in support
of the classification is required., 34 Therefore, the Court's opinion should be interpreted
as requiring the judiciary to examine carefully the constitutionality of any statute that
interferes with the fundamental right to marry, including the rights of same-sex
couples. Furthermore, because the Zablocki precedent applies to all situations in which
the fundamental right to marriage is burdened,35 it is a logical argument that this right
should be extended to same-sex couples.
36
2. Lawrence's Universality of Fundamental Rights
The Supreme Court's marriage precedent centers on the right to order one's private
interactions and family without government intrusion. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
advanced this idea in a manner that is particularly favorable to those seeking legal
31. Id.
32. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 383.
35. Even prison inmates are entitled to the fundamental right of marriage if the right does
not contravene some "legitimate penological objective." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96
(1987).
36. The argument against extending the fundamental right to marriage to same-sex couples
is rooted in reinforcing the historical definition of marriage as a union between one man and one
woman, and protecting the institution from "revisionism." 142 CONG. REc. 17,073 (1996)
(statement of Rep. Seastrand); see also 142 CONG. REc. 17,079 (1996) (statement of Rep.
Canady) (stating that seventy percent of Americans oppose same-sex marriage because they feel
it is immoral and should not be elevated to the status of heterosexual unions). Opponents also
argue that marriage is predicated on the right to procreate, and therefore, by definition, marriage
is dual-gendered. GERSTMANN, supra note 26, at 85. Although the Supreme Court has
mentioned the important link between marriage and raising children, see Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), the Court has never held that the fundamental
right to marry is contingent upon a couple's ability to have children. See Turner, 482 U.S. at
95-96; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. This argument also fails because people who are unable to
have children, for example, the elderly and the infertile, are allowed to marry, and proving a
person's fertility would be a violation of privacy. See GERSTMANN, supra note 26, at 93-96.
2009]
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recognition of same-sex marriage. 37 Lawrence recognized the human dignity of gays
and lesbians and the universality of fundamental rights.
38
In Lawrence, the Court held that the Texas statute criminalizing homosexual
sodomy was unconstitutional because the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment affords all people the right to engage in certain personal and private
conduct without the intervention of the government.39 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, stated that "liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct" and that this liberty protects a
person from unwanted governmental intrusion. 40 Relying heavily on Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,41 the Lawrence Court stated that
"our laws and traditions afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, [and] family relationships., 42 Homosexual
persons may use this constitutionally protected autonomy to make these personal
decisions "just as heterosexual persons do. ' 43 With this statement, Kennedy
acknowledged that homosexuals, like heterosexuals, are entitled to the protection the
Constitution affords.
Justice Kennedy carefully skirted the constitutional issue of formal governmental
recognition of same-sex marriages and civil unions by stating that "[the present case]
does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.'" His opinion nonetheless strongly
favored the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. By emphasizing the essential
liberties and autonomy afforded to all U.S. citizens, Kennedy stressed the more general
notion of the fundamental rights of liberty, privacy, and autonomy as opposed to a
more specific fundamental right of gays and lesbians to engage in sodomy. This
framing of the liberty at stake facilitates the argument that same-sex marriage bans
violate the Due Process Clause because they violate a universal right, as opposed to a
special right for gays and lesbians. By strengthening an individual's right to make
decisions concerning one's personal life without governmental interference, Lawrence
strengthens the argument that gays and lesbians are entitled to the same fundamental
rights heterosexuals already receive.
It is striking that although the Court based its analysis on privacy cases where strict
scrutiny had been applied, the opinion did not follow this standard course and refer to a
fundamental right or strict scrutiny analysis. 45 The Court's ambiguity on the underlying
fundamental interest and the applicable level of scrutiny does not undermine the
importance of the opinion and its declared principles, even though it does complicate
their application. Lawrence reaffirms the idea that the Due Process Clause protects the
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
38. GERSTMANN, supra note 26, at xi.
39. 539 U.S. at 578.
40. Id. at 562.
41. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
42. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
43. Id. at 574.
44. Id. at 578.
45. Renee M. Landers, A Marriage of Principles: The Relevance ofFederal Precedent and
International Sources of Law in Analyzing Claims for a Right to Same-Sex Marriage, 41 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 683, 694 (2007).
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right to order one's personal life free from government intrusion. Furthermore,
Lawrence advances this right by applying the protection to gay and lesbian citizens.
This right so closely mirrors the liberty interests described in the privacy cases, upon
which the Court expressly relies, that it seems that the Court in fact applied some form
of heightened scrutiny. In the future, courts should adhere to this heightened scrutiny
when relying on the jurisprudence set forth in Lawrence.46
Lawrence is significant because it moves past an idea of "gay rights" and special
privileges for gays and lesbians, and moves toward an idea of fundamental rights to
which all citizens are entitled. The Court's precedent establishes both that marriage is a
fundamental right and that homosexuals, like heterosexuals, are entitled to the liberty
rights derived from the Due Process Clause. The right to order one's personal life free
of government intrusion should include the right to marry a person of one's choice,
regardless of whether that person is of the opposite or the same sex. As a result, the
fundamental right to marry should be recognized for same-sex couples.
B. Same-Sex Marriage Bans as Sex Discrimination: The Equal Protection
Argument
Another constitutional basis for challenging same-sex marriage bans that would
require heightened scrutiny derives from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which operates "to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminating
practices, however deeply engrained or longstanding. 4 7 When conducting
constitutional analysis with the Equal Protection Clause, the baseline is "a principle of
equality that operates as a criticism of existing practice ... it protects against
traditions, however long-standing and deeply rooted., '48 "All successful cases for same-
sex marriage rights have relied at least in part on an equal protection argument. ' 49
Two interrelated arguments comprise the equal protection argument: first, same-sex
marriage bans facially discriminate on the basis of sex (the formal argument), and
second, the rationales offered as justifications for sex-based classifications in these
bans rely upon sex stereotypes that are an impermissible basis for government action
(the sex-stereotyping argument).50
46. Recently, two circuits of the U.S. courts of appeals have recognized that the Lawrence
precedent "requires something more than traditional rational basis review." Witt v. Dep't of the
Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2008). In Witt, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Lawrence
Court's reasoning for overruling Bowers v. Hardwick was inconsistent with rational basis review
and evidenced that the Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny in Lawrence. Id. at 817; see
also Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[W]e are persuaded that Lawrence did
indeed recognize a protected liberty interest for adults to engage in private, consensual sexual
intimacy and applied a balancing of constitutional interests that defies either the strict scrutiny
or rational basis label."). But see Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358
F.3d 804, 817 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (holding that Lawrence did not apply strict scrutiny).
47. Cass Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988).
48. Id. at 1174.
49. Justin Reinheimer, Same-Sex Marriage Through the Equal Protection Clause: A
Gender-Conscious Analysis, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 213, 227 (2006).
50. See Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 462
2009]
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The formal argument proposes that same-sex marriage bans discriminate on the
basis of sex because these bans exclude same-sex couples from the right to marriage on
the basis of the sex of their partners. 5' This argument suggests that same-sex marriage
bans facially discriminate on the basis of sex because, for example, if a woman seeks to
marry another woman, she is denied the marital right because she is not a man. 2 This
argument originates from Loving v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the Virginia
miscegenation statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. 53 Some members of the
judiciary have summarily dismissed the formal argument because of the equal
application of the discrimination to both men and women.54 The Supreme Court
expressly rejected such an "equal application" argument in Loving.55 Another reason
the formal argument lacks strength is that many members of the judiciary accept the
notion that the racial segregation that motivated the miscegenation statutes in Loving
was much more egregious and insidious than the motives for same-sex marriage bans,56
that the contexts of the constitutional violations are not similar, and that the
discrimination is not of equal magnitude.
57
On the other hand, the sex-stereotyping argument is more persuasive and successful
than the formal argument. When upholding same-sex marriage bans, courts justify the
bans by using arguments that rely on traditional gender roles within a traditional
nuclear family.5 8 Many of these arguments rest on the notion that traditional marriage
can be the only true marriage because it promotes the "true nature" of men and
women-that is, the "inherent" complementariness of men and women. 59 These sex-
based classifications in same-sex marriage bans rely on "gender-based stereotypes that
tend to perpetuate traditional gender hierarchies and limit the freedom of both women
and men to choose how to structure their lives and relationships."
60
Gender-role arguments run contrary to the constitutional norm that the government
in its treatment of individuals be gender neutral. 61 When states create legislation that
(2007).
51. See GERSTMANN, supra note 26, at 45. For a detailed analysis of the formal sex
discrimination argument, see generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against
Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994). See also In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,435-40 (Cal. 2008) (analyzing the California same-sex marriage
ban through both the formal and the sex-stereotyping argument).
52. See Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 29 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
53. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
54. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10-11.
55. See id. at 8.
56. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11; GERSTMANN, supra note 26, at 47-49.
57. See GERSTMANN, supra note 26, at 47-49.
58. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (justifying the New York same-sex marriage ban because
the legislature could rationally believe that it is better for children to grow up with both a mother
and a father); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 29-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the
Indiana legislature has a rational reason to create laws, like Indiana's same-sex marriage ban,
that promote "responsible procreation" in order to create stable, two-parent homes for children);
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 461-63 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that the Arizona legislature's concern with procreation and protecting children is
a rational basis for restricting the right to marry to opposite-sex couples).
59. See Widiss et al., supra note 50, at 500.
60. Id. at 480.
61. Id. at 463; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996).
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discriminates on the basis of sex, heightened scrutiny analysis is triggered. 2 To
withstand a constitutional challenge, "classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives., 63 The Supreme Court typically has rejected sex-based classifications
resting on stereotypes about the proper roles of the sexes, noting that "[t]he purpose of
requiring the close relationship [between gender-based classifications and important
governmental objectives] is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined
through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional,
often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women." 64 The Court
has rejected these gender-role reinforcing arguments in the context of equal access to
schools,65 employment discrimination, 6 and child support.67 Most importantly, the
Court did not require the plaintiffs in these cases to prove that the statutes were rooted
in a desire to subordinate women. Rather, the Court found the practices
unconstitutional because they each relied on and gave credence to gender roles and
stereotypes and drew express lines based on gender.
In analyzing bans on same-sex marriage, courts must ascertain whether the statutory
objective of these bans reflects archaic and stereotypic gender notions.68 Because
same-sex marriage bans reflect these gender notions and draw gender lines, courts
should apply heightened scrutiny. Many courts, however, have not considered such
factors. 69 In Hernandez v. Robles, the New York Court of Appeals relied on traditional
notions of the proper roles of men and women and perpetuating these roles to children
in upholding a same-sex marriage ban.70 In Morrison v. Sadler, the Indiana Court of
Appeals embraced stereotypes of vulnerable women and philandering men and the
necessity of heterosexual marriage to protect women from being left pregnant and
alone.7' Decisions such as Hernandez and Morrison that support same-sex marriage
bans, in effect, reinforce ideas of feminine weakness, women's proper place in society,
and the value of traditional male-headed households. Endorsing sex-based
classifications on the grounds that men and women, by virtue of their gender,
62. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33.
63. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
64. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982).
65. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34 ('Inherent differences' between men
and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of
the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity.... [Sex-
based] classifications may not be used.., to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women."); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26.
66. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,250-52 (1989) (stating that Title VII
protects women from employment discrimination that is based on sex stereotyping).
67. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975) (invalidating a Utah statute requiring
parents to support their sons until age twenty-one, but their daughters only until age eighteen,
because the state defended the statute relying on "old notions" that a man needs more education
and training to provide a home for his family).
68. See Widiss et al., supra note 50, at 485.
69. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,435-39 (Cal. 2008) (examining the sex-
stereotyping argument, and after a thorough inquiry, dismissing it as a basis for strict scrutiny of
the California same-sex marriage ban).
70. See 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
71. See 821 N.E.2d 15, 29-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
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necessarily play different roles in the lives of their children and in their relationships
harms both women and men, and therefore, these classifications should be rejected as
sex discrimination.7 2 Courts must look at the underlying sex-based classifications in
these bans and engage in reasoned analysis rather than a simple application of
traditional assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.73 Because these
bans reinforce gender roles and the Supreme Court has rejected traditional gender roles
as an important governmental interest justifying gender-based classifications, 74 same-
sex marriage bans should not withstand heightened scrutiny.
C. The Equal Citizenship Argument
Another approach to challenging the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans
uses the concept of equal citizenship advanced by Kenneth Karst. Underlying the
Fourteenth Amendment is a core principle of equal citizenship,75 and "the essence of
equal citizenship is the dignity of full membership in society. '76 Equal citizenship
"gives every citizen a right to be treated as a respected and responsible participant in
community public life., 77 In essence, equal citizenship requires that society treat each
individual as a person who belongs-a person entitled to societal respect and to
participate in society.78 Equal citizenship guards against degradation of a particular
person or group and the imposition of any stigma to that person or group. 79 Thus, any
society that embraces equal citizenship will rebuff any inequalities that impose a
stigma onto a person or group,
80
According to Karst, the equal citizenship argument is a crucial part of both the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."'
Karst points to the Lawrence opinion as an example of how basing an argument in the
Due Process Clause advances the Equal Protection Clause's purpose: "Equality of
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the
latter point advances both interests. 8 2 By advancing the core principles of equal
citizenship, Lawrence represents an important step toward recognizing that the essence
of legal equality is to protect all persons' substantive rights at the same level.83
Lawrence's treatment of substantive due process requires the government to offer
72. Widiss et al., supra note 50, at 505.
73. See id. at 485.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
75. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007) [hereinafter Equal Citizens].
76. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term: Foreword Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977).
77. Equal Citizens, supra note 75, at 102.
78. Karst, supra note 76, at 6.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Equal Citizens, supra note 75, at 100-02.
82. Id. at 136 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)).
83. GERSTMANN, supra note 26, at xi.
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persuasive justification for an invasion of liberty that stigmatizes a social group and
denies its members the status of respected equal citizens.8
4
Equal citizenship is an academic theory. The Court has not explicitly recognized it,
nor formulated a level of scrutiny that should be applied to cases alleging a denial of
equal citizenship. The Lawrence decision appears to recognize the principle, 5 so it
could be deduced that the level of scrutiny applied to equal citizenship constitutional
challenges would be the level of scrutiny applied in Lawrence. Unfortunately, the
Lawrence majority never explicitly stated the level of scrutiny it applied, making
application of the Lawrence level of scrutiny to other cases very difficult.
8 6
However, equal citizenship is both a distillation of the principles underlying the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses and the fundamental idea behind the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. "[It] is not a rule for decision but a principle, a norm 'which
officials must take into account."' 87 Karst argues that equality, the crux of equal
citizenship, is a fundamental interest and that the government would have to advance a
compelling interest in order to justify an invasion into this right.8 8 As a result, arguing
the principles of equal citizenship along with an equal protection or due process
argument could only help advance those arguments. One could assume that heightened
scrutiny should be applied to constitutional challenges under an equal citizenship
argument.
The equal citizenship argument, independent of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, provides strong support for challenges to same-sex marriage bans
because they deny gays and lesbians full societal membership. A same-sex marriage
ban explicitly excludes same-sex couples from the fundamental right of marriage,
thereby sending the message that same-sex couples are not entitled to the same benefits
and privileges associated with marriage that opposite-sex couples receive. The
sentiment behind these bans--"You do not belong"--stigmatizes gays and lesbians
individually and as a group. Same-sex marriage bans prohibit homosexuals from fully
participating in society. In turn, gays and lesbians lose the respect of society since they
become a group of second-class citizens who are not entitled to marriage. Under this
argument, same-sex marriage bans contradict the equal citizenship principle of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
After an examination of the due process, equal protection, and equal citizenship
arguments challenging the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans, this Part has
established that heightened scrutiny should be applied when analyzing these bans, and
that the bans cannot withstand these constitutional challenges. Assuming same-sex
marriage bans would not withstand constitutional challenges under a heightened
scrutiny review, Part II will analyze the structure of immigration law, its underlying
policies, and how it applies to same-sex binational couples.
84. Equal Citizens, supra note 75, at 141.
85. See supra text accompanying note 82.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
87. Karst, supra note 76, at 41.
88. See id. at 40-42.
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II. THE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND IMPEDIMENTS
Same-sex binational couples must navigate the hostile waters of immigration law in
order to maintain their loving relationships in the United States. Because civil marriage
is not available to them, the foreign national of the same-sex couple must seek other
ways to acquire legal permanent resident status. This Part outlines the immigration
avenues available to same-sex binational couples, the policies underlying the current
immigration law structure, and the impact of the federal Defense of Marriage Act,
which acts as a huge impediment for same-sex binational couples.
A. The Family-Based Immigration Policy
A foreign national has four routes to become a legal permanent resident: (1) family
sponsorship, (2) employment-based preferences, (3) the diversity program, or (4)
refugee status.8 9 Although the original Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA
of 1952") laid the foundation for the current employment-based and family-based
categories for immigration, the current immigration scheme, the Immigration Act of
1990 ("IA of 1990"),90 specifically was structured to encourage family unification and
family-based immigration. 91 Current immigration law awards immigrant visas largely
92to those who have family ties to the United States. For example, in 2006, 1,266,129
people became legal permanent residents of the United States.93 Nearly two-thirds of
these individuals were granted this status based on familial relationships.94 Spouses of
U.S. citizens accounted for 339,843 legal permanent residents, more than one-quarter
of the entire group.95
Immigration law also privileges the marital relationship. 96 Spouses of U.S. citizens
experience a much shorter waiting period to achieve legal permanent resident status
than do spouses of green card holders because the spouses of citizens are classified as
"immediate relatives." 97 Immediate relatives are defined as "children, spouses, and
parents of a citizen of the United States. 98 Immediate relatives are not subject to any
immigration numerical limitations." Since immediate relatives are exempt from
numerical limitations, the process moves faster because immigration becomes only a
89. See KELLY JEFFREYS & RANDALL MONGER, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. ANNUAL FLOw
REPORT: U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2007, at 1-4 (2008), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/LPRFR 2007.pdf[hereinafter DHS
ANNUAL FLow REPORT].
90. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
91. Adam Francoeur, The Enemy Within: Constructions of U.S. Immigration Law and
Policy and the Homoterrorist Threat, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 345, 357 (2007).
92. See id. at 358.
93. DHS ANNUAL FLOw REPORT, supra note 89, at 2.
94. See id. at 3.
95. Id.
96. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REv.
1625, 1636 (2007).
97. Id.
98. 8 U.S.C. § 115 l(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
99. See id.
[Vol. 84:689
SAME-SEX BINA TIONAL COUPLES
matter ofprocessing paperwork and standard bureaucratic delays.'1° For other family-
preference immigrants who are subjected to the numerical limitations, the wait to
acquire an immigrant visa is approximately five years.' 0' Undoubtedly, a foreign
national with a U.S. citizen spouse has an advantage when trying to achieve legal
permanent resident status.
The Congressional Record illustrates Congress' goal to create an immigration
policy that emphasizes the family and family unification. 0 2 Representative Bonior
explained that "[t]he number of slots would be expanded so that children and spouses
of permanent residents may join their families in this country."' 1 3 He called the
legislation "pro[-]family" and advocated for the family reunification amendments
because "it is anti[-]family to allow such long separations," and the separations can
lead to illegal immigration because it would then be the only means for many families
to reunite more quickly.l°4 He added that Congress "should not be denying immigrant
families the most fundamental right-the chance to be together."' 0 5 Representative
Fish concurred that "the cornerstone of our immigration policy in this legislation
remains steadfast.., and that is family reunification."' 6 Clearly, Congress intended to
create an immigration policy that united families.
B. The DOMA Complication
Because immigration policy is family-centric, Congress' definitions of "family" and
"spouse" determine who may or may not acquire residency in the United States.
Congress defines "spouse" and "marriage" in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
and by extension, limits the definition of family for immigration purposes. Enacted on
September 21, 1996, DOMA 10 7 limits the definition of a marriage to a legal union
between a man and a woman and requires no state to acknowledge same-sex marriages
contracted in another state. 08 DOMA must be read in conjunction with 1 U.S.C. § 7,
which states that in determining the meaning of any act of Congress, "marriage" is
defined as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,"
and "spouse" is to be defined "[to refer] only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife."'' 9
Even though the discrimination of same-sex binational couples did not begin or end
with DOMA," 0 its negative impact on same-sex binational couples cannot be
100. Abrams, supra note 96, at 1636.
101. See id.
102. See 136 CONG. REc. 27,072 (1990) (statement of Rep. Bonior).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. 136 CONG. REc. 27,073 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fish).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) ("No State... shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State ... respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.").
108. Francoeur, supra note 91, at 357.
109. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
110. See infra Part III.A-III.C.
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overstated. 111 Because DOMA refuses to recognize same-sex marriage or any union of
a same-sex couple, spousal immigration benefits cannot be conferred on same-sex
binational couples. Given that spousal immigration accounts for a quarter of the legal
permanent residents and immigration law fails to recognize same-sex marriages, same-
sex binational couples are disadvantaged to a significant degree when compared with
their heterosexual counterparts. Most importantly, due to DOMA's construction of the
terms "marriage" and "family," it essentially undermines Congress' intent to have a
family-centric immigration policy by dividing the families that are created by same-sex
binational couples. The practical effect of DOMA and the family-sponsorship
immigration method contravenes the family-centric legislative intent behind the IA of
1990.
III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONGRESS' PLENARY POWER AND THE HISTORICAL
DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES IN IMMIGRATION LAW
The Supreme Court gives Congress wide latitude to regulate entry into the United
States and has held that this is one of the "plenary powers" given to the legislature in
the Constitution. 12 The plenary powers doctrine, the doctrine that establishes
Congress' absolute authority over immigration, originated in the 1880s and created a
deferential approach for the courts to the immigration laws. 13 Beginning with the
Chinese Exclusion Case, Congress' power "to exclude foreigners from the country
whenever, in its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been
asserted in repeated instances, and never denied by the executive or legislative
departments."' 14 Congress' plenary power over immigration derives from "the right of
the sovereign to protect itself from the invasion of outsiders and the right to expel
outsiders once they have gained physical access to the United States."' ' The Court has
found that only limited judicial inquiry into matters of immigration legislation is
justified because of the inherently political nature of these policies."I6
Because immigration laws have been essentially immune from judicial constraint,
"the political process allows the majority to have its way with noncitizens."' 1 7 The
judiciary's deferential approach creates inconsistencies in the application of
111. For a thorough discussion of the effect DOMA has on the INA, see generally Matthew
S. Pinix, The Unconstitutionality of DOMA + INA: How Immigration Law Provides a Forum
for Attacking DOM4, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTS. L.J. 455 (2008).
112. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604-06
(1889); see also FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 15, at 13. The court based its reasoning on U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power... To establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization.").
113. Janel Thamkul, The Plenary Power-Shaped Hole in the Core Constitutional Law
Curriculum: Exclusion, Unequal Protection, andAmerican National Identity, 96 CAL. L. REv.
553, 557-58 (2008).
114. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606-07.
115. Abrams, supra note 96, at 1644.
116. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
117. Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
"Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1120 (1998).
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constitutional protections such as due process and equal protection," 8 and at times
becomes a complete abdication of the judiciary's role as a check on congressional
power. This Note does not suggest that Congress should not ordinarily have plenary
power over immigration law. Rather, this Note encourages the judiciary to apply a
more probing scrutiny to challenges to immigration law, giving less deference to
Congress than it has historically given to these challenges. Such extreme deference
overlooks and permits Congress to infringe the constitutional rights of many U.S.
citizens,1 9 and creates a situation where the judiciary abandons its role as a check on
the political branches. 120 Despite the fact that naturalization, immigration, and foreign
relations are committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative branches,121
it is the distinctive duty of the judiciary to shield the Constitution and strike down laws
that are unconstitutional. 1
22
A. A Brief Survey of Discriminatory Immigration Restrictions
Exclusionary immigration restrictions began in 1882 with the passage of the
Chinese Exclusion Act. 123 Motivated by popular resentment toward the influx of
Chinese immigrants looking for opportunities on the railroads or in the Gold Rush,
Congress appeased the masses by forbidding any further immigration or naturalization
of Chinese citizens.124 This ban remained in place until 1965.125 In the 1920s, Congress
established the national origins quota system in an effort to control the ethnic
composition of the Unites States. 126 This system favored northern European immigrants
over all other immigrants and greatly restricted the numbers of non-northern Europeans
118. Thamkul, supra note 113, at 558.
119. Courts have been relatively unreceptive to claims by citizens that they are harmed by
immigration law. For example, citizens claiming injury when their undocumented parents are
deported have not received constitutional protection. Abrams, supra note 96, at 1647 n.95. This
Note, however, advances a stronger argument. The exclusion of same-sex binational couples
from the family preference avenue of immigration directly targets one group of U.S. citizens,
homosexuals, and arbitrarily denies them a series of constitutional rights.
120. The Court is more likely to question Congress' usage of one of its "plenary powers" if,
in using one of these powers, Congress has disregarded or exceeded an overarching
constitutional principle such as federalism or separation of powers. See United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 577-79 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing in the context of the
Commerce Clause that the political branches have a "sworn obligation to preserve and protect
the Constitution in maintaining the federal balance," and that this balance is too vital to freedom
for the judiciary "to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has
tipped the scale too far"). For further discussion, see infra Part III.D.
121. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
122. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating that the judicial
branch's duty is to declare "what the law is").
123. Saby Ghoshray, Race, Symmetry and False Consciousness: Piercing the Veil of
America's Anti-Immigration Policy, 16 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 335, 347 (2007).
124. Id. at 345.
125. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 1131.
126. Id. at 1127.
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who could enter the country, 127 implying a view of superiority of northern Europeans
over all others. 1
28
Both the Chinese Exclusion Act and the national origins quota system were
abolished in 1965 in response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,129 as these exclusionary
immigration policies did not comport with the nondiscriminatory policies set forth in
the Civil Rights Act.' 30 During Congressional hearings regarding the INA of 1965,
Senator Kennedy stated, "[tihis bill [the INA of 1965] is designed to establish the
principle of equality and fair play for people of all nations."' 131 Senator Javits
commented that the INA of 1965 needed to be passed because the national origins
quota system in place was rooted in "the rejected racist assumption that people of one
ethnic origin are superior-socially and culturally-to those of another."'132 Also,
Attorney General Katzenbach commented:
Such a system ought to be intolerable on principle alone. I do not know how any
American could fail to be offended by a system which presumes that some people
are inferior to others solely because of their birthplace. There is no democratic-
indeed no rational-basis for such discrimination. The harm it does to the United
States and its citizens is incalculable.' 
33
Members of Congress and the Attorney General recognized the irrational and
discriminatory basis for these exclusionary immigration provisions, and in the era of
civil rights advancement, repealed these discriminatory provisions of the INA of 1952.
B. The Homosexual Exclusion
Immigration policy historically has discriminated against gays and lesbians as it has
against non-white immigrants. The first manifestation of the "homosexual exclusion"
can be found in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).'3 4 The INA barred
"[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy or a mental defect."'135 In
Boutilier v. INS, the Supreme Court stated, "the term 'psychopathic personality' as
used by Congress... was a term of art intended to exclude homosexuals from entry
into the United States."'
136
Since "psychopathic personality" fell under the medical exclusions of the INA,
enforcement required an elaborate procedure that began with an inspector's suspicion
127. Id. at 1127-28.
128. Id. at 1129.
129. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
130. Johnson, supra note 117, at 1131.
131. Immigration: Hearing on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Naturalization of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2 (1965) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
132. Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Javits).
133. Id. at 9 (statement of Att'y Gen. Katzenbach).
134. Francoeur, supra note 91, at 352.
135. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182
(1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(4) (2006)).
136. 387 U.S. 118, 119 (1967).
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of an alien's homosexuality at a port of entry. 137 Then, the alien would undergo a
medical examination.138 Such a requirement was problematic since sexual orientation
cannot be deduced through a medical procedure. 139 Instead, exclusions were based on
the hunches or perceptions of an immigration official. 140 Inevitably, homosexual aliens
would only be excluded if the alien made a statement that would indicate his or her
sexual orientation. 141 Absent an alien's admission, exclusion was based on the
immigration official's discriminatory perceptions.
14 2
In 1980, the enforcement policy changed from a medical examination to a series of
questions on sexual orientation that would attempt to compel a written admission from
the suspected homosexual alien. 143 Because aliens in detention at a port of entry have
no constitutional protections, as they have not technically entered the United States,
these suspected homosexual aliens could be held indefinitely for refusal to sign the
admission statement. 144 After approximately forty years of banning homosexuals from
entering the country, 145 the homosexual exclusion was finally repealed by the
Immigration Act of 1990. 46
Considering the treatment of non-white immigrants and gay and lesbian immigrants,
Congress has used immigration law to exclude groups it sees as inferior and unfit. The
laws are veiled in neutral language-for example, the generic-seeming term
"psychopathic personality" that did not denote homosexuals until the Supreme Court
stated it did-but the laws have the effect of creating a homogenous population that
comports with Congress' idea of an ideal, heterosexual American. The immigration
exclusions evidence a history of discrimination against different classes of people,
including homosexuals. Once it became clear that society would not tolerate the
blatantly discriminatory exclusions based on national origin, Congress changed the
immigration policy to comport with changing attitudes toward civil rights and
impermissible discrimination. In addition, such discriminatory laws would never pass
constitutional muster if they affected U.S. citizens and occurred in a context outside of
immigration law.
C. Adams v. Howerton
Before the repeal of the homosexual exclusion provision and the passage of DOMA,
Adams v. Howerton challenged the constitutionality of the homosexual exclusion. 1
47
Adams, a male American citizen, married Sullivan, a male foreign national, in an effort
to use the provision of the INA of 1952 that allows spouses of Americans to qualify for
137. See Robert J. Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities for
Gay andLesbian Immigration, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 456 (1994).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 458.
144. Id.
145. Francoeur, supra note 91, at 353.
146. Id. at 356.
147. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
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permanent legal resident status. 1 4 8 Adams presented two issues to the court: first,
whether, within the meaning of the statute, a citizen's spouse must be an individual of
the opposite sex; 149 and second, if interpreted this way, whether the statute was
constitutional.150 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the INS had interpreted the term
"spouse" to exclude persons in same-sex marriages.' 51 The court held that Congress'
decision to preferentially confer spouse status only upon those in heterosexual
marriages satisfies rational basis scrutiny because Congress wished to pass an
immigration policy that furthered "family integrity."'52 Furthermore, the court limited
its constitutional analysis of the INA of 1952, stating that it was within Congress'
plenary power to admit or exclude aliens and that such decisions are subject only to
limited judicial review.15 3 Regarding immigration, the court stated that "Congress has
almost [unlimited] plenary power and may enact statutes which, if applied to citizens,
would be unconstitutional."'
5 4
However, discriminatory immigration laws do affect U.S. citizens, particularly in
the context of same-sex binational couples.155 Why are courts still deferring to
Congress' plenary power in these matters when the rights of U.S. citizens are also
affected? Should not this foundation of discrimination trigger more judicial scrutiny?
D. A Basis for Judicial Scrutiny of Congress'Plenary Power
Although Congress' plenary power is broad, it is neither absolute nor totally
immune from scrutiny for discrimination and injustice. 56 For example, in Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Supreme Court stated that "we
need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which the alleged basis of
discrimination is so outrageous" that Congress' plenary power can be overcome.'57 The
Court did not specify what type of discrimination would be necessary to override
Congress' plenary powers and find such a statute unconstitutional. It is possible "that
denial of entry may be challenged-including denying people entry solely because of
their race or religion."'1
58
Consider the following hypothetical: Congress changes the INA and forbids any
orthodox Jews from acquiring visas. Surely this blatant and arbitrary discrimination
148. Id. at 1038.
149. Adams was decided in 1982, fourteen years before DOMA defined the term "spouse."
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1040.
152. Id. at 1042.
153. Id. at 1041.
154. Id. at 1042.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 1-20.
156. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 15, at 13; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
695 (2001) ("But that [plenary] power is subject to important constitutional limitations."); INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) (stating that Congress must choose "a constitutionally
permissible means of implementing" that power); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (stating that congressional authority is limited "by
the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or
less, the conduct of all civilized nations").
157. 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
158. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 15, at 13.
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would not be tolerated by the courts because it offends a sense of equality and
acceptance. It would seem that the courts would demand that Congress provide a very
compelling reason for such exclusions. The courts would perceive this exclusion as an
impermissible discriminatory line drawn by Congress and an unchecked avenue to
discriminate. If immigration policy as applied to same-sex binational couples offends
another constitutional provision, namely a U.S. citizen's equal protection and due
process rights, should not the judiciary be examining these laws with heightened
scrutiny and less deference to Congress' plenary power? Should not the courts be
checking this congressional power?
1. The Judicial Duty to Confront Congress' Constitutional Abuse
In his dissent in Fiallo v. Bell, Justice Marshall provided a rationale for a higher
level of scrutiny of immigration laws and acknowledged an exception to the almost
complete deference to Congress' plenary power regarding immigration law and
policy.159 In Fiallo, the Court held that sections of the INA of 1952 were "not
unconstitutional by virtue of the exclusion of the relationship between an illegitimate
child and his natural father" from its preference categories. 160 Although the majority
opinion accepted the traditional limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration
legislation, the Fiallo majority did stress that the Court still had the "judicial
responsibility under the Constitution" to review the matter., 6 1 Marshall began his
dissent by reiterating the judicial duty to insure that acts of Congress "comport[] with
Fifth Amendment principles of due process and equal protection." 162 Marshall
commented that the Court's review of the matter was "toothless," and an exercise in
abdication, not due deference to Congress' plenary powers. 163 Marshall acknowledged
that U.S. citizens "have no constitutional right to compel the admission of their
families,"'164 but a problem arose with this general principle because:
Congress did choose to extend such privileges to American citizens but then
denied them to a small class of citizens. When Congress draws such lines among
citizens, the Constitution requires that the decision comport with Fifth
Amendment principles of equal protections and due process. The simple fact that
the discrimination is set in immigration legislation cannot insulate from scrutiny
the invidious abridgment of citizens' fundamental interests.'
65
He then concluded, "[w]hen Congress grants a fundamental right to all but an
invidiously selected class of citizens, and it is abundantly clear that such discrimination
would be intolerable in any context but immigration, it is our duty to strike the
legislation down."'
166
159. See 430 U.S. 787, 804-16 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 800.
161. Id. at 793 n.5 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 805-06.
164. Id. at 807.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 816.
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2. U.S. Citizens' Constitutional Rights and Privileges Are Being Denied
Another example of the Court's deference to Congress' plenary power and Justice
Marshall's dissent to such deference is Kleindienst v. Mandel.'67 Kleindienst asked
whether the First Amendment conferred upon professors the ability to demand
admission of foreign national Mandel into the United States or to compel the Attorney
General to allow Mandel's admission because they wish to hear, speak, and debate
with him in person. 168 Mandel, a Marxist scholar and journalist, was denied entry into
the United States on the grounds that he advocated "the doctrines of world
communism" and had previously abused his entry into the United States. The Court
recognized that the crux of the issue was not concern with the nonresident alien gaining
admission, but the constitutional rights of the U.S. citizens to have the alien enter the
country and explain and defend his views. 169 Nonetheless, the Court held that the
citizens' rights to debate Mandel did not trump the plenary power of Congress to
exclude aliens and the Executive's power to enforce Congress' will.
170
Justice Marshall strongly dissented and asked, "[w]hat is the justification for this
extraordinary governmental inference with the liberty of American citizens?"'
' 71
Marshall emphasized that none of the Court's plenary power precedent needed to be
overruled to allow for Mandel's visitor's visa because "none of them was concerned
with the rights of American citizens."' 172 According to Marshall, the Court's precedent
of deference to Congress' plenary power in regards to the exclusion of aliens was
distinguishable from this case because those cases involved only the rights of aliens. 
173
Marshall stated, "[w]hen Congress' exercise of one of its enumerated powers clashes
with those individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it is our 'delicate and
difficult task' to determine whether the resulting restriction on freedom can be
tolerated."' 74 Marshall construed Kleindienst as an example of the government
impermissibly overreaching into the individual liberty of citizens.
175
The case of same-sex binational couples is more compelling than Kleindienst in that
what is at stake for these particular citizens is greater than the professors in
Kleindienst. In Kleindienst, the issue was the ability of a group of professors to hear
Mandel speak. The liberty at stake was the group's First Amendment right to hear
Mandel's views and to "engage him in a free and open academic exchange.' 76 More is
at stake for same-sex binational couples in that they are claiming the fundamental right
to be with the person they love and share a life with that person-rights enshrined in
the Fourteenth Amendment but denied to same-sex couples by DOMA. 177 In
167. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
168. Id. at 762.
169. Id. at 764.
170. Id. at 769-70.
171. Id. at 777 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 782.
173. Id. at 783.
174. Id. at 782 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967)).
175. Id. at 785.
176. See id. at 760 (majority opinion).
177. See supra Parts I.A., II.B.
[Vol. 84:689
SAME-SEXBINATIONAL COUPLES
Kleindienst, the Court rejected the First Amendment claim to override Congress'
plenary power. 178 The rights same-sex binational couples assert are arguably more
compelling and even more fundamental than the First Amendment right of free speech
and provide a more compelling liberty interest from which to base an argument for
questioning Congress' plenary power.
Fiallo's majority opinion opens the door to more judicial scrutiny of immigration
law. 7 9 Moreover, Marshall's dissents in Kleindienst and Fiallo stress the idea that
when U.S. citizens' constitutional rights are being compromised by immigration, the
Court should show less deference to Congress' plenary power and heighten scrutiny of
immigration law. In Fiallo, Marshall asserts that when Congress gives certain citizens
privileges and denies them to others, "the Constitution requires that the decision
comport with Fifth Amendment principles of equal protections and due process."'
8 0
This analysis is particularly relevant to same-sex binational couples' immigration
problems. Congress has conferred upon opposite-sex couples the privilege of "spouse"
status that accelerates and eases the union of opposite-sex binational couples. Congress
denies this privilege to same-sex binational couples. According to Marshall, this
unequal treatment would warrant judicial scrutiny to see if the immigration "spouse"
privilege would comport with equal protection and due process.
3. Immigration Regulations Must Be Tied to a Legitimate Immigration Purpose
In addition to Justice Marshall's call for heightened judicial review of immigration
laws when these laws compromise a citizen's constitutional rights, Professor Kerry
Abrams argues that particular immigration regulations need to be tied to a legitimate
immigration purpose for Congress' plenary power to be applicable.' 8 1 "[I]f the law in
question has nothing to do with the exclusion of immigrants or the deportation of
immigrants, but instead regulates the lives of citizens[,] then the plenary power
doctrine may not apply at all, and Congress may be overstepping its bounds."',
8 2
Immigration law's exclusion of same-sex couples from the family-preference avenue
regulates the lives of citizens by directly interfering in the personal and familial
relations of same-sex binational couples. In addition, Abrams argues that the Supreme
Court has drawn sharp distinctions "between immigration law, which regulates the
exclusion and deportation of aliens, and alienage law, which regulates" aliens'
presence in the United States, and tends to apply heightened scrutiny to the latter.'8 3 If
Congress is using these particular provisions of immigration law and its plenary power
178. Kleindienst, 480 U.S. at 769-70.
179. See supra text accompanying note 161.
180. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 807 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
181. See Abrams, supra note 96, at 1646. Abrams considers protecting the sovereign from
the invasion of outsiders and expelling outsiders once they have gained physical access to the
United States a "legitimate immigration purpose." Id. at 1644. The crux of Abrams' argument is
that Congress is using immigration law to regulate marriage, which is a not a legitimate
immigration purpose, and therefore, the judiciary should be less deferential to Congress' plenary
power because immigration law has moved beyond the scope of regulating the exclusion of
immigrants. See id. at 1633.
182. Id. at 1646-47.
183. Id. at 1644-45.
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to regulate the lives of citizens, which is not the same thing as excluding aliens and
protecting the sovereign, then the Court has justification to review the immigration
laws that are impermissibly regulating the lives of citizens.
4. The Plenary Power Doctrine Is Limited by Overarching Constitutional Principles
Abrams also notes that the Court has checked Congress' plenary power when it
conflicts with the doctrine of separation of powers and federalism. 184 The Court is
more likely to question Congress' usage of one of its "plenary powers" if, in using one
of these powers, Congress has disregarded or exceeded an overarching constitutional
principle such as federalism or separation of powers. For example, in United States v.
Lopez, a case involving Congress' exercise of its sweeping, plenary-like Commerce
Clause power, Justice Kennedy argued that the political branches have a "sworn
obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution in maintaining the federal balance,"
and that this balance is too essential to freedom for the judiciary "to admit inability to
intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far."'
' 85
In Lopez, Kennedy reasoned that the statute at issue was an affront to federalism, and
because of this, the statute is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' plenary-like
Commerce Clause power.'
86
Applying this reasoning to immigration, it is the judicial branch that violates the
separation of powers doctrine when it refuses to examine the constitutionality of
immigration laws. Despite the fact that naturalization, immigration, and foreign
relations are committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative branches,
187
it is the distinctive duty of the judiciary to shield the Constitution and strike down laws
that are unconstitutional. 188 It is the fact that these immigration provisions seem so
glaringly unconstitutional that the courts' proverbial eyebrow should raise. Deference
is not synonymous with abdication. The judiciary abdicates its constitutional role when
it refuses to review the constitutionality of immigration laws because of the plenary
power Congress supposedly possesses over these matters. As discussed in previous
sections, the Court has acknowledged that there are limits to Congress' plenary powers.
The plenary power doctrine is less absolute than it is perceived.
Congress has drawn yet another impermissible line with immigration law. In doing
so, the judiciary should review challenges to the constitutionality of immigration law
with less deference than it has historically given to immigration challenges because
although the plenary power doctrine is broad, it is not limitless. Excluding only same-
sex binational couples from the family preference avenue has nothing to do with
protecting the sovereignty of the United States and advances no legitimate immigration
purpose. Furthermore, by reviewing the history of immigration law and policy, a
pattern emerges of historical discrimination and animosity towards gays and
lesbians. 189 Christopher Duenas argues that "[i]n refusing to recognize the family
184. Id. at 1646.
185. 514 U.S. 549, 577-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 580.
187. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
188. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating that the judicial
branch's duty is to declare "what the law is").
189. See supra Parts III.A-B.
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relations and rights of [gays and lesbians], the laws show the determination of the U.S.
government in attempting to keep [gays and lesbians] out of the country." 190 In the
past, exclusionary immigration policies eventually have been realized for what they
truly are: impermissible discrimination against a particular group of people. This
discrimination offends the essence of equality and equal citizenship.' 91 The same-sex
exclusion from "spouse" status and its privileges can only be rationalized by using the
same gender-role and sex-stereotyping arguments that are used to advance same-sex
marriage bans. As discussed in Part II.B, these sex-stereotyping arguments are
impermissible governmental arguments and should not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
With the IA of 1990, Congress intended to create an immigration policy that unifies
families. Congress did so by changing the immigration laws so that it is substantially
easier for a spouse of a U.S. citizen to acquire legal permanent residency status. The
Defense of Marriage Act limits the term spouse to only married members of the
opposite sex. Same-sex binational couples are shut out from this preferential
immigration policy, and in turn, same-sex binational couples face separation-the
opposite effect intended by the legislature in enacting the immigration laws. This
practice advances discrimination that offends express principles of equality in the
Constitution. Ultimately, the exclusion denies homosexual U.S. citizens their
fundamental rights and equal protection rights.
Although traditionally the Supreme Court has deferred to Congress' plenary power
while scrutinizing immigration law, the Court's precedent supports the notion that such
deference need not be absolute and that the courts can apply a higher form of scrutiny
to these statutes. The Court should examine the intent behind the legislation and the
practical effect of the statute and determine whether such bans constitute constitutional
infringements on the rights of U.S. citizens.
CONCLUSION
Current immigration law and policy in conjunction with DOMA drastically restrict
the possibility for same-sex binational couples to live together legally in the United
States. Nancy and Eric are not anomalies: the exclusion from the family preference
avenue leaves same-sex binational couples no option but to employ other costly legal,
and sometimes illegal, means to stay together in this country. These individuals, by
virtue of their sexual orientation, are denied the fundamental right of marriage and
equal protection under the law. An opposite-sex binational couple simply does not face
this same obstacle to living together in the United States. The exclusion denies U.S.
citizens in same-sex binational couples their fundamental right to order their private
lives without government intrusion, reinforces gender roles and stereotypes, and denies
homosexuals equal citizenship. Congress intended to create a family-unifying policy
with the 1990 amendments to the INA of 1952. Yet, the exclusion of homosexuals
from the family preference system through the Defense of Marriage Act tears families
apart. Immigration law historically has discriminated against homosexuals, and the
190. Christopher A. Duenas, Note, Coming to America: The Immigration Obstacle Facing
Binational Same-Sex Couples, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 811, 816 (2000).
191. See supra Part II.C.
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exclusion from the family preference system is just another example of such
discrimination. Congress has drawn an impermissible discriminatory line that affects
the lives of U.S. citizens. It is time for the judiciary to scrutinize immigration law with
less deference to Congress' plenary power and discontinue its abdication of its inherent
judicial power.
